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Abstract
On October 1, 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court in Scheinberg v.
Smith,’that the parental consent provisions of the Florida Medical
Practice Act regarding abortion, unconstitutionally invaded a woman’s
right to privacy.
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Scheinberg v. Smith: Toward Recognition of Minors'
Constitutional Right to Privacy in Abortion Decisions
On October 1, 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court in Scheinberg v.
Smith,' that the parental consent provisions of the Florida Medical
Practice Act 2 regarding abortion, unconstitutionally invaded a woman's
right to privacy.3 The judicial precedent leading the court to recognize
this right to privacy for minors was first enunciated by the fifth circuit
in Poe v. Gerstein." The Scheinberg majority found unconstitutional the
Florida Therapeutic Abortion Act's5 requirement that parental consent
must be given children seeking abortion. The requirement violated
young women's fundamental right to privacy in contravention of the
United States Supreme Court's clear pronouncements in Griswold v.
Connecticut' and Roe v. Wade.7
The parental notice and consent cases which led the court to reject
the contested statutory provisions in Scheinberg are the subject of this
comment. Additionally, this comment will briefly examine the history
of privacy afforded children in relation to parental control. The inter-
play of children's abortion rights with the various waiting period provi-
sions of abortion statutes will also be discussed.
I. Children as Chattels
The emerging field of children's rights litigation is a direct result
1. 482 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
2. FLA. STAT. § 390.001 (4)(a) (1981).
3. Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, (5th Cir. 1981).
4. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975).
5. The applicable part of Florida's Statutes section 458.22(3) (1976) reads: "If
the pregnant woman is under eighteen years of age and unmarried, in addition to her
request, the written consent of her parents, custodian, or legal guardian must be
obtained."
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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of, and in sharp contrast to, the iniquities to which children were sub-
jected through the centuries. Historically, the law treated minors as
chattels, unable to legally act for themselves.8 In biblical times, as in
the days of the Roman Empire, parental control of an unmarried fe-
male included complete determination of her future. A father had the
right both to sell his daughter in marriage, and to annul her marriage
vows if he chose.9 Though it is true that children's status improved with
the centuries, minors remained charges of their parents.10 There was no
distinction made between the rights or treatment of small children and
of teenagers on the brink of legal or emotional maturity. All were con-
sidered the property of their parents.1
II. Setting the Stage for Scheinberg
The historical treatment of minors would seem to suggest that the
state, in deference to parents' traditional powers, may condition a preg-
nant minor's right to abortion on parental consent. However, in light of
Roe, which established a woman's right to privacy in her abortion deci-
sion, the fifth circuit in Poe v. Gerstein concluded that these privacy
rights must also apply to an unwed, pregnant Florida teenager.
In Roe, the Court held the decision to terminate a pregnancy is
encompassed both in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal
liberty and the ninth amendment's reservation of rights to the people.1 2
Thus the right to a "zone of privacy"' s was found to be constitutionally
guaranteed. In Gerstein the appellate court extended Roe's analysis
and held the "fundamental right to an abortion applies to minors as
well as to adults."1 4 The appellate court reasoned that the criteria
enunciated in Roe applied even more forcefully to the pregnant teen-
ager, who could suffer physical and emotional infirmities as a result of
an unwanted pregnancy. Additionally, the pregnant teenager may be
subjected to social condemnation resulting from the abrupt termination
8. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 1167 (1973).
10. 387 U.S. 1.
11. 517 F.2d at 789.
12. 410 U.S. at 153.
13. Id. at 152.
14. 517 F.2d at 791.
1 476 Nova Law Journal
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of her education. 5
Because a fundamental right was involved in Gerstein, the fifth
circuit panel strictly scrutinized the Florida statute in order to ascer-
tain whether a compelling state interest justified requiring parental
consent to the minor's abortion. The court found four interests that
could be invoked in defense of the statute: "(a) preventing illicit sexual
conduct among minors; (b) protecting minors from their own improvi-
dence; (c) fostering parental control; (d) supporting the family as a
social unit."'16 None of these interests however, were found sufficiently
compelling to overcome the minor's fundamental right to an abortion.
In Carey v. Population Services International,"7 the Supreme
Court asserted "it would be plainly unreasonable to assume that [the
state] has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child
. . . as punishment for fornication."18 The Gerstein court observed that
parents do not always act in their child's best interests, and may some-
times act nonsensically or punitively when they learn of their daugh-
ter's pregnancy. 9 Ironically, while the statute considered in Gerstein
authorized parents to make the critical decision in permitting or deny-
ing their daughter's abortion, the Gerstein court made clear that it was
the minor daughter alone who would bear financial and legal responsi-
bility for the coming child.20
The fifth circuit pointed out in Gerstein that the statute requiring
a minor to notify her parents of her pregnancy, effectively impeded the
teenager from procuring an abortion. Certainly the potential for
trauma arises when an unwed teenager must face her parents and tell
them she is pregnant. This can be physically and emotionally
detrimental. 1
15. Id.
16. Id. at 792.
17. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
18. Id. at 695 (citing Eisenstat v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)).
19. See e.g., Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D.C. Mass. 1975) (In order to
punish their daughter for her pregnancy, the court found that some parents would not
allow the abortion); In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 949, 25 N.Y.S.D.2d 624, 626
(Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941) stating: "There are parents ... who will by act do that which is
harmful to the child and sometimes will fail to do that which is necessary to permit a
child to ... lead a normal life in the community." Id.
20. 517 F.2d at 793. See FLA. STAT. §§ 744.13 & 827.06 (1976).
21. 517 F.2d at 793 n.ll.
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One year after the fifth circuit decided Gerstein, the United States
Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth22 in-
validated a state requirement that unmarried minors obtain parental
approval before terminating pregnancies. Relying upon its decision in
Roe v. Wade, the Court held a state cannot proscribe abortion during
the first trimester of pregnancy. s The Court reasoned that the state
could not endow a third party with the "absolute and possibly arbitrary
power to prohibit an abortion."2 Nor could the state "delegate . . .a
veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited
from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy. '25 The abortion
decision is so important that not only adults, but unmarried pregnant
minors as well, are protected by the constitution against state
intrusion.26
Supreme Court precedent has established that from the start of
the second trimester of pregnancy, through its duration, the state has a
compelling interest in both the mother's safety and the potentiality of
human life.2 7 States may, therefore, limit the availability of abortions
in the later trimesters and impose place, time and other conditions on
abortion procedures and availability. 28 However, abortions performed
within the first trimester fall outside this significant state interest, even
though "power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches
beyond the scope of its authority over adults. 29 Minors are different
from adults, but are not so different that their most fundamental rights
may be unduly impinged upon. The state's interest in prohibiting mi-
nor's first trimester right to abortion is not compelling enough to with-
22. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
23. 410 U.S. at 163.
24. 428 U.S. 52.
25. Id. at 74.
26. Note, Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV.
L. REv. 1156 (1980). But see Miami Herald, Jan. 31, 1982, at 4A, col. 1 which states
that a thirteen year old who "fought her parents all the way to the State Supreme
Court for the right to have an abortion, had changed her mind. Her announcement
came after the Alabama Supreme Court temporarily blocked the operation. . . .The
girl's decision made the case moot and left unanswered the legal question of whether a
minor can have an abortion without parental approval in Alabama."
27. 410 U.S. 113.
28. 410 U.S. 113.
29. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
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stand strict scrutiny when balanced against the interference this state
prohibition exerts on a minor's fundamental privacy right. Moreover,
while parents' power over their children is great, it is not absolute.
"Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of
their children."30
III. Notification Provisions in Abortion Control Statutes
In addition to parental consent requirements, parental notification
requirements have been subjected to constitutional challenges. In Wynn
v. Carey31 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found provisions of the
Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 197732 unconstitutional. The
statute required that an unmarried minor under the age of eighteen
attempt to obtain consent from both her parents prior to obtaining an
abortion. If one or both parents refused consent, the minor was re-
quired to petition for court authorization of the abortion. In addition,
upon the minor's application for judicial relief the court was required
to notify her parents. Thus, whenever a pregnant teenager sought an
abortion, her parents were always notified. 33
The seventh circuit struck these consent and notification provisions
as both over and underinclusive. The act was underinclusive because
married minors who remained married, or who were divorced or wid-
owed were not included. These minors were not required to consult
with or obtain the consent of their parents. Since the ostensible purpose
of the act was to afford minors some measure of parental guidance in
the decision to undergo abortion, there was no apparent reason for dis-
tinguishing between single minors and minors who were,, or had been,
married.3 4 The act was overinclusive because there was no statutory
exception for single minors who were emancipated or mature enough to
make the decision for themselves.
30. Id. at 170.
31. 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978).
32. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 § 81-23(4): "If. . .consent is refused . . .[it] may
be obtained by order of a judge of the circuit court. . . after such hearing as the judge
deems necessary. . . .Notice of such a hearing shall be sent to the parents."
33. Id.
34. 582 F.2d at 1387.
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The appellate court also found the act constitutionally deficient in
failing to provide for minors who did not understand what an abortion
entails and what its physical or psychological consequences may be.35 If
the parents of an immature, unknowledgeable girl were notified by the
court that their daughter was attempting to circumvent, by judicial in-
tervention, their refusal to allow her abortion, the parents' negative de-
cision would prevail under the statute despite the best interests of the
child. Since the statute did not allow judicial inquiry beyond whether
the girl understood the consequences of an abortion, if the girl was una-
ble to understand, then the court's hands were tied because it was not
authorized under the statute to take any further action. The immature
minor's fate was back in the hands of both of her parents. Even if one
parent consented to the abortion, and the court agreed it would be best
to terminate the pregnancy, the abortion would still be barred by the
other parent's veto." For these reasons the statute failed to meet the
minimum standards set by the United States Supreme Court in Bellotti
v. Baird,37 "that the statute must be 'speedy,' 'nonburdensome' and
preserve the minor's anonymity when she seeks judicial authorization
for an abortion."38 It is well recognized that the "abortion decision is
one that simply cannot be postponed, or it will be made by default with
far reaching consequences." 39
While in some familial relationships parental notification can re-
sult in the minor's psychological sustenance and produce beneficial ad-
vice, where poor intra-familial relations exist the results of notification
can be devastating. Two recent federal district court decisions have
held that an unqualified statutory requirement of parental notification
is an unconstitutionally weighty burden on the fundamental right of a
minor to have an abortion.4 °
35. Id. at 1390. While not enumerated by the court, some consequences, in addi-
tion to the death of the fetus, may be physical discomfort to the mother, grief or guilt.
36. Id.
37. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
38. Id. at 144-45.
39. 443 U.S. at 643.
40. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp.
1172, 1202 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Women's Community Health Center Inc. v. Cohen, 477
F. Supp. 542, 546-48 (D. Me. 1979). See also Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Kansas
City, Missouri Inc. v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981) which held unconstitu-
1 480 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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A parent infuriated by the illicit pregnancy may abuse the minor
daughter. Additionally, physical harm caused the minor by parental
footdragging and delay is foreseeable, especially in the abortion context
which mandates time is of the essence. Some of those possibilities were
described by the mother of a girl waiting for an abortion in a Minne-
sota abortion clinic.4 '1 The Minnesota abortion law requires that a mi-
nor under 18 years 1) notify both her parents; 2) offer the clinic proof
that both parents have been notified, and 3) wait for a 48 hour waiting
period before the abortion can be performed. The necessity of securing
a waiver of parental notification is a chilling and frustrating experience.
[F]or many, the abortion itself is preceded by a harrowing day in
court trying to secure a waiver from a judge against having to tell
parents. Not uncommonly, mother and daughter are thrown into a
conspiracy against a wrathful father who they fear will never be
able to understand how his daughter came to such a sorry pass.
Legal maneuvering can delay the abortion, sometimes dangerously.
One mother nods toward her teenage daughter, now 20 weeks preg-
nant: 'Her boyfriend is black,' says the woman who joined with her
daughter in the fight for the waiver. 'My husband told her if he
ever saw her with a black man, he'd kill her."2
The United States Supreme Court in H. L. v. Matheson43 did not
agree that parental notification as a prerequisite unduly burdens a mi-
nor's right to an abortion. The minor in question there was unmarried,
15 years of age; living at home and supported by her parents. She be-
came pregnant and, after consulting with a social worker and a physi-
cian, decided to obtain an abortion. The physician, however, recognized
he would be subject to criminal penalties for noncompliance,"4 and
would not perform the abortion without notifying his patient's parents.
The pertinent part of the Utah statute considered in H. L. pro-
vides: "To enable a physician to exercise his best medical judgement
tional a statute requiring notice to parents of all minors seeking abortions because it
required notice to parents of mature minors and those for whom it was not in their best
interests to give notice.
41. Abortion. Women Speak Out, Life, Nov. 1978, at 45-54.
42. Id. at 48, cols. I & 2.
43. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
44. Id. §§ 76-7-314(3), 76-3-204 & 76-3-301(3) (1953).
4811Minors' Abortion Decisions
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[in considering whether to perform an abortion] he shall: .. .(2) No-
tify if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor. . . ."'I While it was
urged that Bellotti, decided prior to H. L., had settled the question of
parental consent, Chief Justice Burger's majority decision in H. L. con-
trasted the classes of plaintiffs. In Bellotti the principal class consisted
of "unmarried [pregnant] minors in Massachusetts who have adequate
capacity to give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." '46 In H. L. the class was comprised of
unemancipated minor girls who were living at home, supported by their
parents; they made no claim of maturity. The H. L. majority concluded
the appellant lacked standing to enlarge its challenge to encompass the
statute's effects on all unmarried minor girls, which included those ma-
ture and emancipated. The Court decided the issue within narrow pa-
rameters, holding that a statute delineating a "mere requirement of pa-
rental notice" 47 does not violate the constitutional rights of an
immature, dependent minor living at home. The statute in question did
not grant parental or judicial power to totally proscribe the abortion
procedure. It did necessitate that the physician notify parents, if possi-
ble, if an abortion was to be performed. The Chief Justice opined the
statute promoted family unity and served a "significant state interest
by providing an opportunity for parents to supply essential medical and
other information to a physician. ' '4s However, parents were not statuto-
rily obligated to fill out medical forms.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall thought it clear that the
parental notice requirement "burdens the minor's privacy right." 49 Al-
though earlier decisions had safeguarded family privacy from invasive
governmental interference, Justice Marshall felt the majority distorted
those decisions to achieve an opposite result, thereby excusing an inex-
cusable incursion into the privacy of families. He noted it was unlikely
the state's statutory notice prerequisite would "resurrect parental au-
thority that the parents themselves [were] unable to preserve."50 Be-
45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1974). (emphasis added).
46. 450 U.S. at 406 n.12, (citing 443 U.S. at 626) (emphasis added).
47. 450 U.S. at 409.
48. Id. at 411.
49. Id. at 441.
50. Id. at 448.
8
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sides attempting to alter familial interaction, the statute may also be
too great an intrusion into the family since it mandates lines of commu-
nication which are not there.51 Justice Marshall accurately pointed out
that "[rather than respecting the private realm of family life, the stat-
ute invokes the criminal machinery of the state in an attempt to influ-
ence the interactions within the family.15 2 When lines of family com-
munication break down, it should be outside the scope of state interest
to force speech among family members. This result is consistent with
Wooley v. Maynard5 3 where the Court suggested the first and four-
teenth amendments protect the individual's freedom of thought, which
includes the right to refrain from speaking. The Utah statute in H. L.
required physicians subject to state regulation and licensing to notify
their minor patients' parents. The state has the right to mandate a doc-
tor comply with its notification requirement; this does not infringe upon
the doctor's constitutional rights. However, in Justice Marshall's view,
the constitution protects a child - as a private person - from being
forced to communicate to her parents something she believes will be
detrimental to her well being.
The Utah statute was found constitutional because it was narrowly
drawn and required notification only to parents of an immature, depen-
dent minor. It would seem that states wishing to structure a constitu-
tional notification provision could do so by following the narrow param-
eters of the Utah statute.
51. See also Miami Herald, Jan. 27, 1982, at 15A, cols. 4-6: "If the draft of the
regulation (now in committee) is finalized HHS [Department of Health and Human
Services] will be able to force any family planning clinic to send a notice to the parents
of a minor seeking prescription birth control. In effect parents would be getting a re-
port . . .that their children are sexually active. [W]ould the threat of clinic-as-in-
former result in more teenage pregnancies? Teenagers who don't talk with their par-
ents can either avoid the clinic or lie about their identity. [Parents] . . .want to be
advised [but] whatever our anxieties, the Federal Government cannot mandate family
communication." Id.
52. 450 U.S. at 454.
53. 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). See also, Note, The Spousal Notice and Consul-
tation Requirement: A New Approach to State Regulation of Abortion, 6 NOVA L.J.
457 (1982).
1 6:1982
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IV. How Long Do Ladies in Waiting Have to Wait?
The question of waiting periods as constituting an undue burden
on the right to an abortion, for both adults and minors, has left the
courts divided. In a recent case, Planned Parenthood of Kansas City v.
Ashcroft,54 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
found a forty-eight hour waiting period unconstitutionally long. The
court based its decision on the fact that the waiting period necessitated
two separate visits to the clinic or physician with concomitant addi-
tional time and expense. In addition, the court stated waiting periods
increase "delay, and delay increases the risk to the woman.""
In contrast, in Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of
Akron,56 the district court found that even though a twenty-four hour
waiting period made the abortion decision more expensive, the in-
creased cost was not so great that it would burden a woman's decision
to have an abortion. As a result, the court did not invoke strict scru-
tiny, nor require a compelling state interest. The waiting period re-
quirement in Akron, for example, heavily burdens those girls who can-
not afford two trips to a physician or to a clinic which may be far from
home, and who can ill afford to lose time from school or their job.
Additionally, there is a burdensome physical and emotional cost to the
patient who must wait those twenty-four hours after consulting with
her physician. 57 Other courts have suggested that these burdens do re-
quire strict scrutiny.5 8
V. Scheinberg v. Smith
The effect of many of these precedential decisions was weighed
54. 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 866. See also Women's Medical Center of Providence Inc. v. Robert,
50 U.S.L.W. 2483 (Jan. 15, 1982). (Twenty-four hour waiting period held invalid).
56. 479 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
57. 627 F.2d 785.
58. See also Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 1976). Similar
waiting periods occurred in Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980), wherein
the court stated that "these women will be subject to . . .inconvenience, expense, and
additional anguish attending this rigid requirement." Id. at 785. As a result, the
twenty-four hour waiting period was stricken.
1484 6:1982 1
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heavily in the fifth circuit's construction of the Medical Practice Act,5 9
as enacted by the Florida legislature in 1979. The act included several
subsections regulating abortion conditions for both married and unmar-
ried women. Subsection (4)(a) delineated state requirements for notifi-
cation to and consent of parents of minors who wished to obtain abor-
tions.60 The statute provided that in order for an unmarried minor to be
permitted an abortion, she must have "either the written informed con-
sent of a parent, custodian, or legal guardian or an order from the Cir-
cuit Court."' Failure to comply with these provisions exposed physi-
cians performing abortions to state criminal penalties: "any person who
willfully performs, or participates in, the termination of a pregnancy in
violation of the requirements of this section is guilty of a
felony .. "62
Although the constitutionality of notice and consent requirements
had been addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Bellotti v.
Baird,6" the Florida court had not addressed the constitutionality of its
statute until subsection (4)(a) was challenged by Dr. Mark D.
59. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4) (1981).
60. Id. This section reads:
(4) Prior to terminating a pregnancy, the physician shall obtain the writ-
ten informed consent of the pregnant woman or, in the case of a mental
incompetent, the written consent of her court-appointed guardian.
(a) If the pregnant woman is under 18 years of age and unmarried, in
addition to her written request, the physician shall obtain the written in-
formed consent of a parent, custodian, or legal guardian of such unmarried
minor, or the physician may rely on an order of the circuit court, on peti-
tion of the pregnant unmarried minor or another person on her behalf,
authorizing, for good cause shown, such termination of pregnancy without
the written consent of her parent, custodian, or legal guardian. The cause
may be based on a showing that the minor is sufficiently mature to give an
informed consent to the procedure, or based on the fact that a parent un-
reasonably withheld consent by her parent, custodian, or legal guardian, or
based on the minor's fear of physical or emotional abuse if her parent,
custodian, or legal guardian were requested to consent, or based upon any
other good cause shown. At its discretion, the court may enter its order ex
parte. The court shall determine the best interest of the minor and enter
its order in accordance with such determination.
61. 482 F. Supp. at 532.
62. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(10) (1981).
63. 443 U.S. 622.
11
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Scheinberg in a class action suit on behalf of "all unmarried minor
pregnant women desiring to terminate their pregnancies," 4 and on be-
half of their physicians. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida found that subsection (4)(a) unconstitu-
tionally infringed upon a minor's right to privacy in her abortion
decision. 5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in
striking down subsection (4)(a). The appellate court found the issue
had been resolved by Bellotti and held that although judicial authoriza-
tion or parental consent may be required by a state before it permits
an unmarried minor to obtain an abortion, a judge must allow the
abortion if the minor "satisfies the court that she is mature and well
enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her
own." 6 Even if the minor fails to demonstrate this maturity, the court
must permit the abortion if it decides this measure would be in the best
interests of the minor. 7 The appellate court found subsection (4)(a)
"mandates that a Florida court base its authorization of a minor's
abortion on what it finds to be the best interests of the minor, without
regard to the minor's maturity. Thus the provision runs directly afoul
of Bellotti. ... " The unconstitutional section, which placed the en-
tire decision upon the judge where parental consent was not obtained,
ignored the emancipation, intelligence or ability of the minor to under-
stand and cope with the consequences of her situation. Because the lan-
guage of the subsection was deemed mandatory ("the court shall deter-
mine the best interest of the minor and enter its order in accordance
with such determination")69 the subsection failed. Had the statute re-
quired judicial determination of the minor's best interests only in cases
of immature, unemancipated minors, the statute may have escaped the
fatal flaw of being overinclusive.
64. 482 F. Supp. at 532 n.7.
65. Id. at 540.
66. 443 U.S. at 647.
67. Id. at 647-48.
68. 482 F. Supp. at 532.
69. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (1981).
Nova Law Journal
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Conclusion
The abortion cases demonstrate the still evolving constitutionally
recognized right of privacy. The middle line drawn by courts protects
certain values considered basic to constitutional rights. Within this
framework, judicial decisions have recognized that unwanted teenage
pregnancies threaten family and social stability.
Since the decision to have an abortion is primarily one of medical
concern"0 and personal morality, the courts and legislatures should re-
frain from imposing moral judgments on, and impediments to, the exer-
cise of this private, personal decision. The state's deference to familial
privacy is a consideration weighty enough to overcome any interest the
state might have in trying to enforce a parental veto over the minor's
abortion decision. Minors, as well as adults, should have the right to
control the reproductive processes of their own bodies. If a minor, in
consultation with a physician, makes the decision to abort within the
"safe" first trimester, the state should not interfere.
Judith L. Weinstein
70. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979).
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